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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MYRON BROUGH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No.
14434

vs.
RAMON R. APPAWORA,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
* * * * * *

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, a non-Indian, claims injury from an accident occurring within the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.
The defendant is an enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe
and challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court to render
judgment in this case.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A default judgment was entered on September 9, 1975,
in the District Court of Uintah County against defendant and
in favor of plaintiff for $28,800.00 general and special damages and for $33.00 costs of Court.

On or about October 22,
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1975, defendant appeared specially and moved the Court, pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside the default and default judgment and to
dismiss the action on the basis of lack of jurisdiction over
the defendant and the subject matter.

Memoranda were submitted

to the Court by both parties and the Court heard oral argument
of the Motion on December 9, 1975. The defendant appeals
herein from the Order of the Court dated December 12, 1975,
which denied said Motion.

Said Order erroneously refers to the

Motion as having been made by the Ute Indian Tribe, not a
party to this suit, when it was in fact made for and on behalf
of the defendant Ramon R. Appawora.

The record verifies that

there was but one motion filed to vacate the judgment, notwithstanding the fact that the Order of December 12, 1975,
refers to "motions on file."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the Order
of the District Court denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
and, thereafter, the dismissal of this action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident which gave rise to this action occurred
on November 13, 1974, on a county road right-of-way in Uintah
County at a location 2 miles south of Fort Duchesne, Utah
(Record pp. 22 and 30, hereafter references to the record
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will be as follows: "R.

") . The uncontradicted evidence be-

fore the Court below is that this location, "2 miles south of
Fort Duchesne, Utah", is located entirely within the exterior
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (R. 20). The
Uintah and Ouray Reservation is the Indian Reservation which
is the residence of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation (R. 20).
That evidence further shows that the defendant,
Ramon R. Appawora, was and is an enrolled member of the Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (R. 18 and
19), and that his residence (R. 18), and the place where
service of process was accomplished by a Uintah County Sheriff's
officer (R. 3 ) , are located at Randlett, Utah, which is also
located entirely within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation (R. 20). The plaintiff is not an Indian.
The uncontradicted evidence further shows that the
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is a
federally recognized Indian Tribe exercising the powers of
self-government within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation, and that said Tribe has a functioning
Tribal Court which has civil jurisdiction over all cases involving enrolled members of the Tribe (R. 20).
Finally, the uncontradicted evidence before the
trial court shows that the Ute Indian Tribe has never held an
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election accepting Utah state jurisdiction over itself or its
members pursuant to 25 U.S.C. Section 1321 et seq. or Section
63-36-9 et; seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, or otherwise granted,
ceded or surrendered its jurisdiction to the State of Utah
(R. 21).
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT, AN ENROLLED UTE
INDIAN, IN AN ACTION ARISING ON AN INDIAN
RESERVATION.
POINT I
THE ACCIDENT GIVING RISE TO THIS ACTION OCCURRED
IN INDIAN COUNTRY WITHIN THE UINTAH AND OURAY
RESERVATION.
The accident which is the subject of this action
occurred on a county road right-of-way within the exterior
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.

The

law is well settled that a road right-of-way is part of the
Indian reservation for purposes of determining the applicable
jurisdiction to hear a case involving an Indian.
Under federal law "Indian Country" is defined as
follows:
....[Tlhe term "Indian country", as used in this
chapter, means (a) all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)
all dependent Indian communites within the borders
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of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same, (18 U.S.C. Section 1151)
In a footnote in its recent decision in the case of
DeCoteau v. District County Court,
300, 304, fn 2, 95 S. Ct.

420 U.S. 425, 43 L. Ed. 2d

(1975), the U.S. Supreme Court

noted as follows:
If the lands in question are within a continuing
"reservation," jurisdiction is in the tribe and
the Federal Government "notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, [such jurisdiction] including rightsof-way running through the reservation." 18 U.S.C.
Section 1151(a) ***. While Section 1151 is concerned,
on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the
Court has recognized that it generally applies as
well to questions of civil jurisdiction. [Citations]
The North Dakota Supreme Court, reversing an earlier
• opinion which held that the state courts had jurisdiction over
a civil case involving an automobile accident occurring on a
state highway within an Indian Reservation, has stated as
follows:
There can be no doubt that state highways within
the boundaries of a reservation are part of the
reservation. "Indian Country" is defined by
Federal law as being all land within the limits
of an Indian reservation under jurisdiction of
the United States Government, "including rightsof-way running through the reservation,..."
18 U.S.C.A. Section 1151. Gourneau v. Smith,
207 N.W. 2d 256 at 258 (N. Dak. 1973).
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See also Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W. 2d 812 (N. Dak.
1975) .
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently likewise held:
[W]e note that the fact that the events of interest
here may have occurred within the right-of-way for
a state highway avails the defendant nothing. Rightsof-way running through a reservation remain part of
the reservation and within the territorial jurisdiction of the tribal police.
Ortiz-Barraza v. U.S., 512 F. 2d 1176, 1180 (9th
Cir. 1975) .
The decision in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S.
351, 7 L. Ed. 2d 346, 82 S. Ct. 424 (1962), specifically held
that fee patented land located within a township within an
Indian reservation had not lost its status as part of the Indian
reservation.

This decision is based, in part, upon relevant

language in 18 U.S.C. Section 1151 (cited, supra) which states
that not only rights-of-way, but fee patented lands as well,
within an Indian Reservation, retain their status as "Indian
country" and remain part of the reservation.
This position has been followed in the supreme courts
of the states as well.

See, £.cj. , Kain v. Wilson, 161 N.W. 2d

704 (S. Dak., 1968), which held that state courts had no jurisdiction to hear and determine a civil action by a non-Indian
against a tribal Indian for alleged wrongful use and possession
of land located in "Indian country," even though a patent had
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issued to the land in question and title thereto was vested in
the non-Indian plaintiff.
This court recognized that a state highway running
through an Indian reservation is a part of the reservation in
the case of State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. 2d 741, 743
(1945).

The case involved U.S. Highway 40 running through the

Uintah and Ouray Reservation referred to as the "Uintah Indian
Reservation" by the court.
Based on the established facts in the record and
applicable law, there is no question but that the incident in
question herein involves a Ute Indian defendant in a cause of
action arising on and within the Ute Indian Reservation.
POINT II
FEDERAL AUTHORITY AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY PREEMPT
EXERCISE OF STATE JURISDICTION.
The appropriateness of looking to federal law in any
case involving an Indian on his reservation, stems from the express reservation of authority by the U.S. Constitution, to
the Congress "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, U.S. Constitution.

See e.£.,

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219, fn 4, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251,
79 S. Ct. 269 (1959) and McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,
411 U.S. 164, 172, fn 7, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129, 93 S. Ct. 1257 (1973).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions
that:
It is thoroughly established that Congress has
plenary authority over the Indians and all their
tribal relations, and full power to legislate
concerning their tribal property. The guardianship arises from their condition of tutelage or
dependency; and it rests with Congress to determine when the relationship shall cease; the mere
grant of rights of citizenship not being sufficient
to terminate it. Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373,
391-2, 65 L. Ed. 684, 41 S. Ct. 342 (1921).
It is equally well established that:
When Congress has once established a reservation,
all tracts included within it remain a part of the
reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285, 54
L. Ed. 195, 30 S. Ct. 93 (1909).
See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 7 L. Ed. 2d
346, 82 S. Ct. 424 (1962), Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 37
L. Ed. 2d 92, 93 S. Ct. 2245 (1973), and DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 43 L. Ed. 2d 300, 95 S. Ct.
(1975), reaffirming this point.
The classic case denying state courts jurisdiction
over reservation Indians for civil cause of action arising in
the Indian's reservation, is Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 3
L. Ed. 2d 251, 79 S. Ct. 269 (1959).

In this case, the U.S.

Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of
Arizona which had held that Arizona courts had jurisdiction of
a civil suit against reservation Indians for goods sold to
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them by a non-Indian operating a store on the reservation.
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise
of state jurisdiction here would undermine the
authority of the tribal courts over reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of
the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial
that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the
Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took
place there. *** The cases of this court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations. 358 U.S. at 223.
The doctrine of Williams v. Lee in a situation such
as this case presents has been strengthened since it was pronounced in 1959. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
the sole means by which a state can acquire civil jurisdiction
over reservation Indians for cause of action arising on the
reservation is by following the requirements of 25 U.S.C.
Section 1321 et: seq.

As stated in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax

Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 180, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129, 93 S. Ct.
1257 (1973):
Appellee cites us to no cases holding that this
legislation may be ignored simply because tribal
self government has not been infringed. On the
contrary, this court expressly rejected such a
position only two years ago. [Kennerly v. District
Court, 440 U.S. 423 (1971), see infra.]
The footnote following this statement states:
Indeed, the position was expressly rejected in
Williams, itself, upon which appellee so heavily
relies. Williams held that "absent governing
Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them. [Citation] Id., footnote
21, [Emphasis the Court's.]
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Clearly then, the right enunciated in Williams v. Lee
is a right which must be viewed from the perspective of the individual Indian himself, rather than from the tribal point of
view.

The right is that of the individual Indian to have the

tribal court of his reservation hear and decide cases against
the Indian arising on the reservation.

The Navajo Tribe, as

a Tribe, had no more interest in the debt which was the subject
matter of Williams v. Lee, than does the Ute Tribe in the auto
accident which is the precipitating event herein.

The Supreme

Court in Williams v. Lee denied jurisdiction to the Arizona
state courts because they did not have jurisdiction, whether a
distinct tribal interest in the transaction was involved or
not.
k

The plenary power of Congress exercised in its trustee

relationship to American Indians has so pervaded the field of
Indian affairs so as to completely preempt the state from encroachment into reservation matters, except upon such condition
as the Congress itself may dictate.

See 25 U.S.C. Section 1321

et seq. discussed below.
The federal government, on the other hand, has continued to recognize tribal sovereignty and the right of Indians
to govern themselves.

See e.£. , Indian Self-Determination Act,

25 U.S.C. Section 450 et seq.

As this court has observed in

Allen v. Merrell, 6 Utah 2d 32, 305 P. 2d 490, 493 (1956):
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The Indian tribes have not entirely lost their
character as sovereign entities, but retain a substantial degree of autonomy under which they may
and do operate independent of state government.
They have the power to adopt a constitution, enact
tribal laws to which members of the tribe are subject,
to prevent the sale or alienation of tribal lands,
and to negotiate with federal, state and local
governments. They also have the power to tax, to
employ counsel and to prosecute actions for the tribe.
As recent as March 6, 1956, the U.S. Court of Appeal
for the Eighth Circuit in the case of Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation stated,
"We hold that the Indian tribes, such as the defendant
Oglala Sioux of the Pine Ridge Reservation, South
Dakota, still possess their inherent sovereignty
excepting only where it has been specifically taken
from them, either by treaty or by Congressional Act.
[231 F. 2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956)]
The Utah Supreme Court has also noted:
[lit is the uniform holding of the courts that, so
long as Indians maintain their tribal relations,
the courts will recognize the tribal customs prevailing and administered by such tribes.
***

They [the Indians] were and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when
they preserved their tribal relations; not as states,
not as nations, not as possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people,
with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations, and thus far not brought under
the laws of the Union or of the state within whose
limits they reside. (U.S. v. Kagima, 118 U.S. 375).
In re: Wo-Gin-Up's Estate, 57 Utah 29, 192 Pac.
267, 270-1, (1920). [Emphasis added.]
POINT III
UTAH STATUTES PROHIBIT EXERCISE OF STATE JURISDICTION WITHOUT FORMAL TRIBAL CONSENT
The Congress of the United States has authorized the
states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country provided both
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the state and the tribe consent to such jurisdiction:
The consent of the United States is hereby given
to any State not having jurisdiction over civil
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians
are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country
situated within such State to assume, with the consent
of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country
or part thereof which would be affected by such
assumptionf such measure of jurisdiction over any
or all such civil causes of action arising within
such Indian country or any part thereof as may be
determined by such State to the same extent that such
State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of
action, and those civil laws of such State that are
of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within
such Indian country or part thereof as they have
elsewhere within that State. 25 U.S.C. Section 1322(a).
In response to this 1968 federal law, the Utah State
Legislature in 1971 enacted Sections 63-36-9 through 63-36-17,
U.C.A. 1953 (1975 Pocket Supplement).

Specifically, Section

63-36-9 U.S.A. provides:
The state of Utah hereby obligates and binds
itself to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction
over Indians and Indian territory, country and
lands or any portion thereof within this state
in accordance with the consent of the United
States given by the act of April 11, 1968, 82
Stat. 78-80 (Public Law 284, 90th Congress),
to the extent authorized by the act and this
act.
The term "Indian Country" is used in both the federal and state
statutes (compare to cases applying 18 U.S.C. Section 1151 as
noted above).
Section 63-36-13 deals with the subject of "Civil
jurisdiction" and states as follows:
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The state of Utah shall assume jurisdiction over
civil causes of action as set forth in this act,
between Indians or to which Indians are parties
in the lands described in each tribal resolution
sixty days after issuance of the governor's proclamation to the same extent it has jurisdiction
over civil causes of action as elsewhere within
the state. The civil laws of the state shall
have the same force and effect within such lands
as they have elsewhere within the state, except as
otherwise provided by this act.
The Utah act and the federal act establish necessary
conditions precedent before the assumption of jurisdiction will
be effective.

Both 25 U.S.C. Section 1326 and Section 63-36-10

U.C.A. 1953 require that a tribal consent election be held before state jurisdiction may be applied to the reservation and
its Indian residents.

25 U.S.C. Section 1326 makes the

following requirement:
State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this
subchapter with respect to criminal offenses or
civil causes of action, or with respect to both,
shall be applicable in Indian country only where
the enrolled Indians within the affected area
of such Indian country accept such jurisdiction
by a majority vote of the adult Indians voting at
a special election held for that purpose. The
Secretary of the Interior shall call such special
election under such rules and regulations as
he may prescribe, when requested to do so by the
tribal council or other governing body, or by
20 percentum of such enrolled adults.
Section 63-36-10, in conformity with the federal statute, provides as follows:
State jurisdiction acquired or retroceded pursuant to this act with respect to criminal offenses
or civil causes of action shall be applicable in
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Indian country only where the enrolled Indians
residing within the affected area of such Indian
country accept state jurisdiction or request its
retrocession by a majority vote of the adult
Indians voting at a special election held for that
purpose. All special elections shall be called
pursuant to federal law.
Section 63-36-11 imposes the additional requirement that the
Governor of the State formally accept the "cession of jurisdiction" and thereafter issue a proclamation defining the
extent of the assumption by the State.
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the uncontradicted evidence before the District Court was:
That the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation, has never accepted Utah State Jurisdiction over itself or its members pursuant to
25 U.S.C. Section 1321 et seg. or Section 63-36-9
et seg. U.C.A. 1953, or otherwise granted, ceded
or surrendered its jurisdiction to the State of
Utah. (R. 21)
Absent such acceptance of jurisdiction, the district court
could neither assume nor exercise jurisdiction over defendant,
an enrolled reservation Indian, for a cause of action arising
on his reservation.
The absolute mandatory nature of the requirement of
a tribal election as a precondition to state assumption of
jurisdiction over Indians on their reservation is stated explicitly in the case of Kennerly v. District Court of Montana,
440 U.S. 423, 27 L. Ed. 2d 507, 91 S. Ct. 480 (1971).

This

case arose when suit was commenced in a Montana state court
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against members of the Blackfeet Tribe to recover a debt arising
from the purchase of groceries in a store in Browning, Montana,
a town incorporated under Montana law, but located within the
exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation.

In 1967, the

Blackfeet Tribal Council had passed a resolution apparently
giving the Montana state courts concurrent jurisdiction over
suits against members of the Tribe.

The Montana trial and

supreme courts upheld jurisdiction over the Indians.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment solely
because the procedures specified in 25 U.S.C. Section 1326 had
not been followed, in that no tribal consent election was ever
held.

Absent such election, the court heldf the State of

Montana could not assume or exercise its court jurisdiction over
the defendant reservation Indians, despite the consent of the
I
Tribal Council.

In the present case, not only is a tribal

consent election absent, but there has never been any attempt
by the Ute Tribal Business Committee to cede or grant jurisdiction to the State of Utah.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has considered this
issue several times in recent years and each time held against
state court jurisdiction.

In Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W. 2d

256 (N. Dak. 1973), the North Dakota Supreme Court held not
only that the state highways within the boundaries of an
Indian reservation were in fact part of the reservation for
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jurisdictional purposes, but that, absent compliance with
25 U.S.C. Section 1321, el: seq. , the state courts could not
exercise jurisdiction over claims arising out of an automobile
accident involving an Indian defendant which occurred within
the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation.
Likewise in Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W. 2d
812 (N. Dak. 1975), the North Dakota Supreme Court considered
facts on "all fours" with the present case:
whether or not the North Dakota courts have jurisdiction of an action brought by a non-Indian against
an enrolled Indian residing on an Indian reservation
for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident
which took place on a state highway within the
limits of the Indian reservation on which the enrolled Indian resided. 231 N.W. 2d at 814.
As in its other cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled
against state court jurisdiction, noting as follows after
citing to the Williams and McClanahan cases:
[A]ny change from the present case law would require
action by the United States Congress. The appellants
are asking this court to assume the duties and responsibilities which are vested solely in the United
States Congress. The arguments presented should
be addressed to that body. 231 N.W. 2d at 815-6.
Plaintiff in this case had previously attempted to obtain
remedy in both the state and federal courts.

a

See Schantz v.

White Lightning, 386 F. Supp. 1070 (D.C.N.D. 1973), afffd, 502
F. 2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
The Montana Supreme Court in Blackwolf y. District Court,
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493 P. 2d 1293 (Mont. 1972), ordered the dismissal of a case in
state juvenile court against enrolled Indians for acts of delinquency allegedly committed within the exterior boundaries of
their reservation, even though the tribal juvenile court had
"remanded" the case to the state juvenile court.

The court

noted that the procedural prerequisites of 25 U.S.C. Section
1321 et. seq. had not been followed by either the state or the
tribe, and stated as a preliminary premise to its decision as
follows:
At this point we emphasize that all matters concerning the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts
over enrolled Indian citizens who reside within the
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation are
controlled solely by federal law, as to acts or
transactions within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation. 493 P. 2d at 1294
Emphasis the court's.
In the case of Wauneka v. Campbell, 526 P. 2d 1085
(Ariz. Ct. of App. 1974), the court held that Arizona cannot
enforce its motor vehicle laws or its safety responsibility act
against Navajo Indians on their reservation, absent compliance
with 25 U.S.C. Section 1321, ejb seq. , despite the fact that
the Navajo Tribe had incorporated certain parts of the Arizona
Motor Vehicle laws as the law of the Tribe.
In Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F. 2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974),
the Circuit Court reversed the refusal to assume jurisdiction
by the federal district court in an action between reservation
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Indians for wrongful death arising out of an automobile accident
occurring on an Indian reservation, noting that, because of
the State of North Dakota's failure to fulfill the requirements
of 25 U.S.C. Section 1321 et seq., the courts of the State of
North Dakota would not have had jurisdiction.
The North Dakota Supreme Court even went to the extreme
of denying jurisdiction in a case involving the voluntary consent
of the Indian defendant to the jurisdiction of the state court
in Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W. 2d 54 (N. Dak. 1975).

In that

case, non-Indian plaintiffs sued an enrolled Indian defendant
for a claim arising out of an automobile accident occurring
on a state highway within the exterior boundaries of the Fort
Totten Indian Reservation.

The defendant Indian had signed a

form giving her consent to state jurisdiction pursuant to a
state statute which provides that such consent may be obtained
from individual Indians.

The relevant tribal court could only

exercise jurisdiction for cases under $300.00 in amount.

The

North Dakota Supreme Court held that, absent compliance with
25 U.S.C. Section 1326 by tribal consent election, the state
courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant Indian
even though no other judicial forum existed in which the plaintiffs
could get relief.

The court noted the language from the McClana-

han decision quoted above and concluded as follows in response to
the contention that the test of Williams v. Lee should be applied
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only when there is a demonstrable interference with tribal
sovereignty, rather than mere failure to comply with 25 U.S.C.
Section 1326:
Thus, it may be seen that the Williams test of
"infringement" or "interference" has for all
practical purposes, been abandoned. Public Law
90-284 applies to the assumption of jurisdiction
by any state over any Indian reservation and as
to any subject matter. It is difficult to envision
a clearer statement of federal preemption. Thus,
we are unable to read beyond the opening phrase
of the Williams test in an effort to find "residuary"
state jurisdiction. 232 N.W. 2d at 58.
Finally, a recent article in the Utah Law Review,
"Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation," 1973 Utah Law
Review, Summer, p. 206 at 221, notes as follows:
The rule of Williams v. Lee — limiting jurisdiction in reservation-based contract cases between Indians and non-Indians exclusively to tribal
courts — has been extended to reservation based
torts. Thus, if an automobile accident between
an Indian and a non-Indian were to occur on a reservation, the state court would be precluded from
exercising jurisdiction if the non-Indian were to
sue first. Since the state court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, it would make no difference
if the Indian defendant were to be served with
process off the reservation.
POINT IV
STATE OFFICERS CANNOT VALIDLY SERVE STATE PROCESS
ON AN INDIAN ON HIS RESERVATION.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 493 P. 2d 1093 (Colo. 1972), held that a summons
served on an enrolled member of an Indian tribe by a deputy
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sheriff, on the Indian reservation where the Indian resided,
did not give the state juvenile court jurisdiction over the
Indian in a paternity action, even though conception was
alleged to have occurred off of the reservation.
In Annis v. Dewey County Bankf 355 F. Supp. 133
(D.S.Dak. 1971), the federal court enjoined enforcement of a
state court judgment against an enrolled reservation Indian.
The court noted that the procedural prerequisites of 25 U.S.C.
Section 1321, ei: seq. , had not been complied with and denied
jurisdiction even though the security agreement in question
was signed off of the reservation, its breach occurred off of
the reservation, and the Indian was served with state process
off of the reservation.

The court stated that

This argument fails to recognize that the actual
attachment by state officials must be made on the
reservation and state officials have no jurisdiction
on Indian reservations either to serve process on an
enrolled Indian or to enforce a state judgment.
355 F. Supp. at 135-6.
POINT V
ADEQUATE REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF IN
TRIBAL COURTS
As shown by the evidence presented to the District
Court below (see R. 20), the Ute Indian Tribe has a functioning
Tribal Court which exercises civil jurisdiction over all cases
involving enrolled members of the Tribe.

Plaintiff has avail-

able to him an adequate remedy in the Ute Indian Tribal Court;
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he will not be left remediless by the dismissal of this action.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the recent case of United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 42 L. Ed. 2d 706, 717, 95 S.
Ct.

(1975), restated the holding of Williams v. Lee which

confirmed the propriety of requiring non-Indians to pursue their
remedies in tribal courts for claims against Indians arising
on Indian reservations.
In holding that the authority of tribal courts
could extend over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their transactions on a reservation with
Indians, we stated: "It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took
place there. [Citations omitted.] The cases
of this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations. ***"
CONCLUSION
This case is of extreme importance to every Indian
in the State of Utah, as well as to the defendant.

It poses the

crucial question of what circumstances may justify a state
court in interposing itself into Indian reservation matters.
In this case the State District Court asserted that
it had authority to enter a default judgment against an Indian
who had been served by a state officer in Indian country, in
an action arising from an automobile accident occurring within an Indian reservation, all of which is contrary to federal
law and the express provisions of Section 63-36-9 ejb se£. U.C.A.
1953 (1975 Pocket Part).
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Both subject matter and personal jurisdiction being
absent herein, this Court should reverse the Order of the
District Court and order the dismissal of this action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this SLQ^day of February,
1976.
.BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & HOWARD

Scott C. Pugsle
Attorney for Defendant
Appellant
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